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THE 1998 DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT 
The presidency of H.E., Dr. Ugo Mifsud Bonnici, the Fourth President of 
Malta, had a number of institutional 'firsts'. One can mention that the Presi­
dent was the first to preside over the workings of the Commission for the 
Administration of Justice set up by Article 101 A of the Constitution. He was 
the first President to address presidential messages to Parliament. The Presi­
dent was the first to dissolve Parliament twice during his term of office, in 
1996 and in 1998. More significantly, he was the first Head of State, since 
Independence to preside over a political crisis involving the loss of confi­
dence of a government by Parliament. 
This article purports to review some of the constitutional implications in re­
gard to the dissolution of Parliament in 1998 as well as the vote of confidence 
that led to the dissolution. Our constitution, in it's 34 years of existence has 
started to evolve its own conventions and practices, understood in their clas­
sic constitutional formulation as rules of political practice considered as bind­
ing but not enforceable in a Court of Law. The institutional workings behind 
the withdrawal of confidence by Parliament, the first instance since Independ­
ence, bears an interest beyond the political contingency, and may therefore 
serve as a guideline for future events. 
The political crisis started in November 1998, when the former Prime Minis­
ter, Mr. Dom Mintoff started to abstain from voting during the debate on the 
budget, thereby annulling the one seat majority enjoyed by the government 
without actually toppling the government headed by the then Prime Minister, 
Dr. Alfred Sant. The Speaker was called upon on various occasions to make 
use of the casting vote. 
The crisis precipitated during the debate on the resolution presented by gov­
ernment in regard to the Cottonera project. The Prime Minister made the fol­
lowing statement in Parliament, just before the final vote on the resolution 
was taken: 
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"Sinjura President, irrid naghlaq billi nghid ii l-grupp 
parlamentari u l-ezukuttiv nazzjonali kkonfermaw id-decizjoni 
li habbarna l-gimgha ii ghaddiet fil-media ii kontra dak ii 
ghidna fil-bidu ta' dan id-dibattitu, mhux se jkun hemm 
insistenza min-naha taghna ii l-vot ta' fiducja jghaddi permezz 
tal-voti kollha tal-membri parlamentari minghajr casting vote, 
imma l-vot ta' fiducja fuq din il-mozzjoni hu mizmum bhala 
vot ta' fiducja u qed nistennew ii jghaddi minn dan il­
Parlament. Jekk ma jghaddix minn dan il-Parlament, il-Gvern 
se jqis ii tilef vot ta' fiducja. " 
The Prime Minister's statement therefore emphasized two points: 
a) That the government considered the majority of all the members of the
House as no longer applicable to the resolution and
b) That this notwithstanding the government still considered the vote as one
of confidence.
On the same day, July 7th, 1998, the final vote was taken and Mr. Mintoff 
obliged by voting against the motion which, after a division, was defeated by 
35 votes to 34. 
The Prime Minister did not indicate the government's course of action in the 
aftermath of the vote. In this context reference may be made to a statement 
made on March 28th, 1979, by Mr. Jim Callaghan, British Prime Minister in 
the aftermath of a loss of a vote of no confidence in the House of Commons. 
He stated: 
"Mr. Speaker, now that the House of Commons has declared 
itself, we shall take our case to the country. Tomorrow I shall 
propose to Her Majesty in parliament that parliament be dis­
solved as soon as essential business can be cleared up, and I 
shall then announce as soon as possible - and that will be as 
soon as possible - the date of the election and the date of meet­
ing of the new parliament. " 
The constitutional background to the Prime Minister's statement lies in the 
provisions of article 76 of the Constitution, and specifically subsection 5(a): 
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"If the House of Representatives passes a resolution, supported 
by the votes of a majority of all the members thereof, that it 
has no confidence in the Government, and the Prime Minister 
does not within three days either resign from his office or ad­
vise dissolution, the President may dissolve Parliament. " 
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The Constitution of Malta has to a large extent incorporated in a written form 
the unwritten conventions of the British Constitution, particularly in the defi­
nition of those areas where the Head of State "acts in accordance with the 
advice of the Cabinet or a Minister" (Article 85). These have been considered 
to have retained their conventional nature since whether the Head of State has 
received or acted in accordance with such advice may not be enquired in a 
Court of Law (Article 85, subsection 2). 
An important addition to British practice, however, was introduced in the re­
quirements contained in article 76(5)(a), for a vote of no confidence to be 
carried namely those of a majority of all the members of Parliament expressed 
through a resolution. The reason behind such a requirement was to avoid the 
creation of political instability arising from a snap vote in Parliament, which 
would leave the government defeated. So a Resolution is required and a sim­
ple majority of those present and voting alone would not be enough. 
Clearly, the expression "all the members of the House" had the added conse­
quence, from a technical aspect of excluding the Speaker from using the cast­
ing vote since in this circumstance Parliament either reaches the required 
number of votes or not. No tie is possible. The Prime Minister was clearly 
conscious of this factor. 
This provision does not go as far as a constructive vote of confidence would 
require. It, however, ensures that Parliament would be conscious of the insti­
tutional consequences of the vote prior to the vote itself being taken. Parlia­
mentary stability is a constant feature of our parliamentary majorities as a 
consequence of the two-party system that has dominated the political scene 
since Independence. When the Constitution was being drafted, and when it 
came into force however, the political situation was completely different. 
Parliament had five political parties represented and in 1964 the majority party 
enjoyed an overall majority of only one seat. 
Other Constitutions ensure that votes of no confidence do not the result from 
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snap votes. The Constitution of Italy, for example, requires that "la mozione 
di fiducia deve essere formata da almeno un decimo dei componenti della 
Camera, e non puo essere messa in discussione prima di tre giorni della sua 
presentazzione". (Articolo 94). 
The Prime Minister's statement clearly indicated that the Cottonera resolution 
was no snap vote since the issue of confidence was already before Parliament. 
Through this statement, the Government exercised its political prerogative of 
linking the resolution to a question of confidence and of choosing to reduce 
the political threshold from an absolute to a simple majority. 
Victory, all be it with the Speaker's casting vote would, of course have been 
sufficient. Conversely the loss of confidence on the resolution could have 
brought into action another prerogative; the Presidential prerogative to dis­
solve Parliament if to the President's mind, the conditions contained in article 
76(5)(A) existed following Parliament's removal of confidence. 
The Constitution specifically stipulates that the President may dissolve Par­
liament on the advice of the Prime Minister. Article 76(5) provides: 
"In the exercise of his powers under this section the President 
shall act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minis­
ter." 
However, 
"The President may act in accordance with his own deliber­
ate judgment in those cases stipulated in article 85 of the Con­
stitution, amongst which there is, Subsection (a): "in the ex­
ercise of the powers relating to the dissolution of Parliament 
conferred upon him by the proviso to subsection ( 5) of section 
76 of this Constitution. " 
This constitutes another departure from the British situation in that our Con­
stitution envisages the possibility of the President dissolving Parliament WITH­
OUT the advice of the Prime Minister as long as the elements of article 76(5)(a) 
concur. Not so in the United Kingdom: 
"There is no instance in this country, since the Restoration, of a 
1999 
Sovereign attempting to dissolve Parliament without or against 
the advice of the Ministry. " ( Constitutional and Administrative 
Law - 0. Hood Phillips and Jackson 61h Edition Page 147). 
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The government limped on for a few more weeks after the confidence vote and 
on the 3rct. August 1998, the advice to dissolve Parliament was tendered by the 
Prime Minister to the President in terms of Article 76(5) referred to above. 
What is of interest is that the President did not simply accept the advice ten­
dered. He spelt out the circumstances in which the advice was being accepted. 
This becomes manifest when comparing the proclamation the President is­
sued when dissolving Parliament in 1996, to that of 1998. 
In 1996 Parliament was also dissolved before the natural time limit of five 
years and also on the advice of the then Prime Minister, Dr. Eddie Fenech 
Adami. The important difference being that Dr. Fenech Adami had not been 
defeated in Parliament when he tendered his advice. 
The President's proclamation, published in the government gazette of the 23rct 
September 1996, simply made reference to subsection (5) of section 76 of the 
Constitution of Malta that, "in the exercise of (the President's power to dis­
solve Parliament) the President shall act in accordance with the advice of the 
Prime Minister". The official statement published on the same date consisted 
of a laconic statement noting that the Prime minister had received the advice 
and "in accordance with the Prime minister's advice the President signed two 
proclamations ... to hold the General Election. 
The President's official statement in 1998 included two important innovations: 
a) In addition to a generic reference to Article 76, and to the Prime minis­
ter's advice in terms of subsection ( 5)( c) of the said article, the President
brought into action that part of Article 76 whereby the President may act
on his own deliberate judgment. In fact it was expressly stated that
"Il-President ma deherlux li ghandujezercita d-diskrezzjoni lijirrif}uta li
jx olxji l-Parlament, kif is-subartikolu ( 5 )( c) ta' l-istess artikolu jaghtih
is-setgha li jaghmel, billi ma jqisx li huwa fl-interess ta' Malta li l-Gvern
jitkompla minghajr ma tkun tezisti fil-Parlament maggoranza li ssostnih
konsistentement ".
The import of this addition to the normal wording used in Presidential procla-
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mations dissolving Parliament is quite fundamental in understanding the so­
lution to the 1998 crisis. The President did not invoke the powers granted to 
him by virtue of article 76 (a), which allow the President to dissolve Parlia­
ment after a motion of no-confidence is carried by an absolute majority of 
Parliament. The President, however, neither ignored the parliamentary reality 
that the government no longer enjoyed Parliament's confidence. 
For the first time the President granted recognition to the constitutional figure 
of a government that did not enjoy Parliament's confidence by the words "ma 
jqisx li huwa fl-interess ta' Malta li gvern jitkompla minghajr ma tkun tezisti 
fil-Parlament maggoranza li ssostnih konsistentement". The only logical con­
struction to the president's use of the word "konsistentement" qualifying Par­
liamentary defeat is the official recognition of a situation whereby the govern­
ment lost Parliament's confidence and was unable to regain it. This view is 
strengthened by the emphasis of the President's power act on his own deliberate 
judgment - "Ma dehrux li ghandu jezercita d-diskrezzjoni tieghu." 
b) The second important difference between the two proclamations was that in
1998, the President directed that "11-Prim Ministru bil-kabinett tieghu ghandu
jkompli fid-direzzjoni generali u 1-kontroll tal-Gvern ghal dak li jirrigward 1-
amministrazzjoni ordinarja, salv dak li hemm mahsub fl-artikolu 76(4) tal­
Kostituzzjoni." This is important because for the first time, the administration
that leads the country into the general elections was officially defined as a care­
taker government limited to the ordinary day-to-day administration of the coun­
try. Another indication of an administration that lost Parliament's confidence.
It would seem therefore that we followed the conventional practice whereby 
dissolution of Parliament is not an immediate and automatic result of the gov­
ernment's defeat on a vote of confidence or a vote of no confidence. The 
President however, remains in such circumstances the guarantor of the proper 
constitutional process. 
In "11-Manwal tal-President tar-Republika", a compendium of the President's 
powers and duties compiled by the President, on the President's powers to 
dissolve Parliament, the President has this to say: " Is-subartikolu (5) ta' 1-
artikolu 76 jaghti setghat kbar ta' garanzija kostituzzjonali, kontra kull abbuz 
possibbli min-nahha ta' 1-ezekuttiv." (Page 31). 
To-date no such remedy of last resort was deemed necessary. 
